A Taxonomy of Hyperlink Hiding Techniques by Geng, Guang-Gang et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
3.
24
38
v2
  [
cs
.IR
]  
3 A
pr
 20
14
A Taxonomy of Hyperlink Hiding Techniques
Guang-Gang Geng1, Xiu-Tao Yang2, Wei Wang1, and Chi-Jie Meng1
1 China Internet Network Information Center, Computer Network Information
Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China, 100180
{gengguanggang,wangwei,mengchijie}@cnnic.cn
2 Beijing Institute of Electronic System Engineering, Beijing, China, 100854
xiutaoyang temp@163.com
Abstract. Hidden links are designed solely for search engines rather
than visitors. To get high search engine rankings, link hiding techniques
are usually used for the profitability of underground economies, such
as illicit game servers, false medical services, illegal gambling, and less
attractive high-profit industry. This paper investigates hyperlink hiding
techniques on the Web, and gives a detailed taxonomy. We believe the
taxonomy can help develop appropriate countermeasures.
Statistical experimental results on real Web data indicate that link hiding
techniques are very prevalent. We also tried to explore the attitude of
Google towards link hiding spam by analyzing the PageRank values of
relative links. The results show that more should be done to punish the
hidden link spam.
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1 Introduction
Most Web surfers depend on search engines to locate information on the Web.
Link analysis algorithms [1], such as PageRank [2] and HITS [3], are usually
used for Search engines ranking. Link analysis algorithms assume that every
link represents a vote of support, in the sense that if there is a link from page
x to page y and these two pages are authored by different people, then the
author of page x is recommending page y. In particular, PageRank is the basis
of Google’s search technology [4].
Web spammers try to mislead search engines to make a high rank in search
results [5]. In this context, hyperlink hiding techniques are often used to de-
ceive search engines. Spammers hope that many small endorsements from these
pages with hidden links result in a sizable PageRank for the target page. Several
questions naturally arise: what link hiding techniques are the spammers using;
and, how prevalent are hidden spam links on the Web? This paper attempts to
answer those questions.
The rest of sections are organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature
review. Section 3 gives a comprehensive taxonomy of current hidden link spam
techniques. Section 4 describes the experimental analysis on 5,583,451 Chinese
Web sites. At last, section 5 draws the conclusion.
22 Related Work
Hidden links are designed to increase link popularity, which are invisible for
visitors [6]. Google considers hyperlinks hidden by small characters as deception
[7]. Gyongyi etc al. point out that hidden links are often used in honey pot to
boost the ranking of the spam pages [8]. They further present a comprehensive
taxonomy of current spamming techniques and survey content hiding techniques,
where spam links hidden by avoiding anchor texts or tiny anchor images are
mentioned [5]. Link-hiding related features are not paid more attention to in
statistical Web spam detection studies [9][10][11].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previously published literature that
directly studied how prevalent, successful, or varied hidden link spam techniques
are on the Web. This paper attempts to study hidden link spam in detail. It is
hoped that the findings can help in developing appropriate countermeasures.
3 Hyperlink Hiding Techniques
There are many different ways to hide links from visitors while leaving it perfectly
viewable to search engines. In this section, we will examine current hyperlink
hiding techniques used by spammers and attempt to categorize them based on
their features. Just as the work on JavaScript redirection spam [12], we present
short examples to show the hiding techniques really used by spammers. Simple
techniques are presented first and are followed by more advanced ones.
3.1 A: Making Anchor Text Font Color the Same as Background
Color
The simplest and oldest method that spammers use to create hidden links is
to make the font of anchor text the same color as the background. Here is one
example.
<span style=“background:white; ” >
<a href=“target.html” style=“color:white”> invisible anchor text </a>
</span>
In this example, the color scheme is defined in the HTML document. Color
schemes can also be defined in an attached cascading style sheet file (CSS).
Sometimes, spammers also consider background images. They set the image
color to be the same as the font color, which is relatively harder to detect.
3.2 B: Making Anchor Text Font Color Almost Match Background
Color or Background Image
Instead of setting the font color to entirely match the background color, some
spammers and web masters set their font colors to almost match the background
color. The idea behind this method is that they believe that they are thwarting
the search engines’ software detection systems by slightly changing the color of
the text.
3<div style=“background-color:white; ” >
<a href=“target.html” style=“color:#feffee”> text color similar to white </a>
</div>
3.3 C: Setting Tiny Anchor Text or Placing the hyperlinks in a
Tiny Block
Making tiny anchor text is another hyperlink hiding method. This way, the
hyperlink can be set small enough, such as 1 pixel high, even 0 pixel. Here’s a
simple example of that.
<a href=“target.html” style=“font-size:0px”> tiny text </a>
In HTML, the div element is often used for generic organizational or stylistic
applications. Spammers can also use div to set the link size. The following is
another example.
<div style=“font-size:0px;”> <a href=“target.html” >invisible text</a> </div>
Perhaps the most common use of div element is to carry class or id attributes
in conjunction with CSS to apply layout, typographic, color, and other presenta-
tion attributes to parts of the content. In the previous example, the font-size:0px
can also be defined in a CSS file. Besides, div block size can be set via width and
height attributes. For example, <div style=“width:1px;height:1px;”>, where the
div size is 1 pixel.
Another example of hiding a hyperlink via tiny scrolling block is presented
below.
<marquee scrollAmount=1 width=1 height=1>
<a href=“target.html”> text in a tiny scrolling block </a>
</marquee>
In this example, target.html is put in a scrolling block with area 1× 1 pixel,
which is invisible to Web users.
3.4 D: Disguising Anchor Text as Plain Text
Sometimes, spammers insert hyperlinks into a paragraph, where the anchor text
looks like plain text. Here’s a paragraph of text on a site:
A user wouldn’t see any hyperlinks, even if they moused over every word in
the paragraph. But if you happened to click on just the right word, you’d get
whisked away to a SEO site. Actually, there is a hidden link under the anchor
text “SEO company”. If you view the source of the page, here’s what you’ll see:
4The <a href=“http://www.seomarketleaders.com” onMouseOver=
“window.status=‘’;return true;” style=“cursor:text;color:black;
text-decoration:none;”> SEO company</a> follows strict
rules to insure the clients website reach the top of search engines and stay there.
3.5 E: Placing Hyperlinks in High-Speed Scrolling Blocks
The <marquee> tag is a non-standard HTML element which causes text to scroll
up, down, left or right automatically [13]. Although the W3C advises against its
use in HTML documents, it’s still widely used. SCROLLAMOUNT attribute
sets the speed of the scrolling. A bigger value for SCROLLAMOUNT makes
the marquee scroll faster. If the SCROLLAMOUNT value is big enough, the
scrolling block will be invisible to the naked eye. Here is a simple example.
<marquee height=1 width=8 scrollamount=3000>
<a href=“target.html”> text in a high-speed scrolling block </a>
</marquee>
The default scrollamount value is 6. The value in the example is 3000, which
is too fast to see.
Similar effects can also be achieved through the use of JavaScript or HTML
<blink> element [13] [14].
3.6 F: Putting Links outside the Screen
Using cascading style sheets, you have the option to absolutely or relatively
position any division. Using absolute position, you can simply position the text
you wish to hide any number of pixels off the screen to the left of the window.
Here are some example codes:
.hiddenclass { position : absolute;left : -977px; }
If you put that in your style sheet and then assign the class “hiddenclass” to
your div, then the div will display 977 pixels to the left of the visible screen -
i.e., it will not appear on the screen. Here is a example:
<div id=“hiddenclass”> <a href=“target.html”> invisible anchor text </a> </div>
The absolute position can also be set in the div directly as follows:
<div style=“left: -977px; position: absolute; top: -977px”>
<a href=“target.html”> invisible anchor text </a>
</div>
In the example above, left : −977 may be written in more complex formats,
such as left : expression(23− 1000).
5In addition to the methods described above, users can use CSS text-indent
property or margin-left property to put hyperlinks outside the screen. A example
is presented below.
<div style=“text-indent:-999px;”><a href=“target.html”>hidden text</a> </div>
3.7 G: Using Visibility:Hidden or Display:None Style Commands
An alternative to the method above is to simply use the built in features of style
sheets to hide hyperlinks:
.hiddenclass { visibility : hidden;}
Again, if you put that into a style sheet and then assign the class “hidden-
class” to your div, the hyperlinks in the div block will not appear in the browser
window.
3.8 H: Hiding Hyperlinks via JavaScript
JavaScript is an open source programming language commonly implemented
as part of a web browser in order to create enhanced user interfaces and dy-
namic websites [15]. Google claims that search engines have difficulty accessing
JavaScript [7]. In 2011, labnol.org reported that Google indexes JavaScript based
Facebook comments, but there is no clear report that Google parsers JavaScript
codes on the whole Web. This fact encourages spammers to hide hyperlinks by
the aid of JavaScript. Here is a simple example:
<script language=‘‘JavaScript” type=“text/javascript”>
document.write( “<div style=‘visibility:hidden’>” );
</script>
<a href=“target.html”>keywords</a>
<script language=‘‘JavaScript” type=“text/javascript”>
document.write( ‘‘</div>” );
</script>
The example is easy to understand, which is a packaging of the method
described in section 3.7. In the above codes, <div> and </div> tags are embed
in JavaScript codes separately, which may not be indexed by search engines.
However, the hyperlink target.html is displayed in html codes, which is more
likely to indexed by search engines. In a similar manner, almost all the link hiding
techniques described in this section can be further disguised with JavaScript.
Next, let’s look into a more complex example.
6<div id=“ql1000”>
<a href=“target.html” title=“keyword”>
target keyword
</a>
</div>
<script language=“JavaScript”>
var xa= [
“\x64\69\x73\x70\x6C\x61\x79”, “\x6E\x6F\x6E\x65”,
“\x71\x6c\x31\x30\x30\x30”, “\x73\x74\x79\x6C\x65”,
“\x67\x65\x74\x45\x6C\x65\x6D\x65\x6E\x74\x42\x79\x49\x64”];
document[ xa[4]]( xa[2])[ xa[3]][ xa[0]]= xa[1];
</script>
The above JavaScript codes are designed in rather vague terms. The ele-
ments of array xa are written with ASCII characters. The last line of the above
JavaScript codes is document[‘getElementById’](‘ql1000’)[‘style’][‘display’]=‘none’,
which makes all the content, including hyperlinks, in the div named ql1000 in-
visible. In order to avoid presenting the whole style assignment directly, script
can build up the style assignment via string concatenation. One very straight
forward example is presented below.
<script type=‘‘text/javascript”>
document.getElementById(‘‘q” + ‘‘l” + ‘‘1000”).style.display=‘‘n” + ‘‘o” + ‘‘ne”;
</script>
What is worse, JavaScript as a programming language, has many functions
and operators, which throw off a human readers. The following codes show the
flexibility of JavaScript.
<script language=‘‘javascript”>function HexTostring(s){
var r=‘’;
for(var i=0;i<s.length;i+=2){
var sxx=parseInt(s.substring(i,i+2),16);
r+=String.fromCharCode(sxx);}
return r;}
eval(HexTostring(‘‘646f63756d656e742e676574456c656d65
6e74427949642822716c3130303022292e7374796c652e6469
73706c6179203d20226e6f6e6522”));
</script>
These codes are essentially equivalent to the previous example, yet look com-
pletely different.
3.9 I: Hiding Hyperlinks via Cloaking or Redirection Techniques
Cloaking is a Web spam technique in which the page presented to the search
engine spider is different from that presented to the user’s browser [16]. Some
7spammers hide target hyperlinks using cloaking technique. Similarly, spammers
also use redirection techniques to hide targeting hyperlinks. Among the redirec-
tion spam techniques, JavaScript based redirection is the most notorious and
difficult to catch [12]. Wu et al. [16] and Chellapilla et al. [12] have conducted
comprehensive studies of cloaking and redirection techniques respectively, so the
techniques will not be repeated here. However, it’s important to point out that
we do not consider the redirected target URL, but the hyperlinks in the redirec-
tion page as hidden links. For example, A redirects to B, and C is a hyperlink
in page A. In this paper, C is a hidden link, but B is not seen as a hidden link.
3.10 J: Hiding Hyperlinks in Pull-Down Menu
Pull-down menu is also called a drop-down menu, which is a menu of commands
or options that appears when you select an item with a mouse. A drop down
menu can make it easier to display a large list of choices - since only one choice is
displayed initially, the remaining choices can be displayed when the user activates
the dropbox. Some spammers insert the target hyperlinks into a long pull-down
list, which are hard to find.
3.11 K: Inserting Links into Long Title or Meta Tags
Generally, web browsers show the preceding part of a long title. Thus, some
spammers insert urls into long title. Similarly, meta tags provide structured meta
data about a Web page and they are used for search engines. Although they have
been the targets of spammers for a long time and search engines consider these
data less and less, there are pages still using them.
3.12 L: Hiding Div “Below” the Visible Layer
Another sneaky way to hide a hyperlink fromWeb users while keeping it available
to the search engines is to put the hyperlinks in a layer that is “behind” the
visible layer. The CSS z-index property specifies the stack order of an element,
which is supported in all major browsers. An element with a greater stack order
is always in front of an element with a lower stack order. One example hiding
hyperlinks via z-index is presented below.
<div id=‘‘front” style=‘‘position:absolute; z-index:1”>
<img src=‘‘image.gif” >
</div>
<div id=‘‘back” style=‘‘position:absolute; z-index:-1”>
<a href=‘‘target.html” target=‘‘ blank”> target keyword</a>
</div>
8The codes show that the second div has a negative stack order, which deter-
mines the target.html is behind the image.gif . Besides z-index, “overflow:hidden”
can also hide the hyperlinks below the visible layer. Here is a simple example.
<style type=‘‘text/css”>
#spam{width:99px;height:20px;overflow:hidden;position:absolute;}
#spam a{display:block;line-height:20px;text-decoration:none;}
</style>
<div id=‘‘spam”>
<a href=‘‘/”>&#160;</a>
<a href=‘‘target.html” title=‘‘keywords”>
target keyword
</a>
</div>
In the example above, target.html is covered by a non-breaking space.
4 Prevalence of Link Hiding Techniques
Link-hiding can be considered an adversarial problem. As commercial search
engines develop algorithms to detect and discard certain types of hidden links,
new techniques for hiding links will be developed. In last section, we examined
current hyperlink hiding techniques used by spammers and categorized them
based on their features. In this section, we study the prevalence of hidden spam
links, and how prevalence of the variety of techniques described in Section 3.
We carried out the analysis on 5,765,357 Chinese homepages (http://www.
+ domain name) in Sep. 2012, including .com, .net and .cn domain names. To
detect the Web pages with hiding links, we first train a cost sensitive naive bayes
classifier on 103 pages with hidden links and 271 normal pages. The cost sensitive
model ensures a high recall of pages with hidden links. Then, we filtered the
5,765,357 pages with the trained model. The detection results contain quite a few
false alarms, but it’s enough for us to analyze the prevalence of hidden links. By
random sampling from the suspicious set and carrying out manual verification,
we approximately determined the number of pages with hidden links. Table 1
tabulates the statistics in detail.
Table 1. Percentage occurrence of hidden link spam among Chinese Web pages
URL Type Count / Total Percentage
.com/.net/.cn 81775/5765357 = 1/70.5 1.42%
9It is noticed that a number of Chinese pages use hyperlink hiding techniques.
To analyze the prevalence of the variety of techniques described in Section 3, we
randomly sampled 4727 pages with hidden links from .com/.net/.cn set. Each
sampled hidden link spam page was manually analyzed. All the 4727 samples
were labeled with the types of techniques they used. Besides, all the hidden links
are extracted for further analysis. In total, 16767 unique target hyperlinks are
hidden in the 4727 pages.
Table 2 describes the prevalence of hidden link techniques in detail. The table
shows that the 4727 pages contain 16767 unique hidden links. F, G and H are
the most popular link hiding techniques, which account for 75.3% of that total.
These three techniques can be easily used to hide multiple hyperlinks. It can be
observed that some of the 4727 web pages contain more than one link hiding
technique.
Table 2. Prevalence of different link hiding techniques
techniques number(percentage)=>number of hidden links
A 102 (2.2%) => 661
B 51 (1.1%) => 493
C 137 (2.9%) => 561
D 322 (6.8%) => 357
E 136 (2.9%) => 1987
F 1157 (24.5%) => 68661
G 511 (10.8%) => 30192
H 1888 (39.9%) => 51570
I 86 (1.8%) => 2071
J 151 (3.2%) => 527
K 255 (5.4%) => 103
L 53 (1.1%) => 779
All 4849 (4849/4727=102.6%) => 157962(unique links: 16767)
Are the 16767 target pages punished by the search engines? We do not know
the detailed ranking strategy of commercial search engines, but we can explore
this problem from a side by analyzing the PageRank values of the target hyper-
links. Google provides a public interface, toolbarqueries.google.com, for querying
the PageRank values. Table 3 shows the average PageRank values of target hid-
den links and randomly selected 39756 urls from DNS resolution logs.
Table 3 shows that the 16767 hidden links have an average PageRank value
1.34, which is higher than that of the randomly selected urls. To some extent, the
result means that Google needs to establish a more effective punitive mechanism
for the hidden links.
We further analyzed the high-frequency words in the anchor texts of the
16767 target hyperlinks. The top 20 high-frequency keywords and the corre-
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Table 3. Comparison of average PageRank values
hidden links randomly selected urls
Number 16767 39756
Average PageRanks 1.340 1.137
sponding types are described in figure 1. The statistics show that gambling
sites, personal game servers and medical services are the main types of the hid-
den links. Most of the sites belong to shady or illegal industries.
Fig. 1. The high-frequency words in the anchor texts of the target hyperlinks.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we presented a variety of commonly used link hiding techniques,
and organized them into a taxonomy. We analyzed the prevalence of common
link hiding techniques on the web. Just as the previous work on Web spam [5]
[12], we argue that such a structured discussion of the subject is important to
raise the awareness of the research community. Given that most of the sites using
link hiding techniques are shady or illegal industries, more should be done to
punish the hidden link spam.
In the future, we should pay more attention to two things. The first is study-
ing link hidden spam on a bigger data set, which includes multilingual samples.
The second is developing a proper countermeasure to address the problem as
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a whole, despite the variety of different link hiding techniques. One possible
solution draws support from maturing optical character recognition techniques
(OCR) [17]. The motivation is that as a computer vision technique, OCR can
only read the visible content on the Web page like humans. The snapshot of
a Web page can be easily taken via some softwares, such as wkhtmltopdf [18]
and snapshotter [19]. All the visual text on the snapshot image can be recog-
nized via OCR techniques as textV ector. If an anchor text does not exist in
the textV ector, the corresponding hyperlink is identified as hidden link. And, of
course, the relative position of anchor text should also be taken into account.
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